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The microeconomics of food security
Jean-Paul Chavas*
This article develops a dynamic microeconomic model of food security under
uncertainty, with special focus on the relationships between food demand, nutrition
and human survival. It investigates the in£uence of entitlements on malnutrition,
hunger and starvation under uncertainty. It develops useful insights on the links
between food security and a number of policy instruments commonly used in
dealing with malnutrition and starvation.
1. Introduction
Despite a rising real income per capita in the world, millions of people die
every year from malnutrition and starvation and many more face hunger
and insecurity in satisfying their basic wants. While the starvation rate in the
world population is relatively low, starvation remains a feature found in
many developing countries. Also, short of starving to death, individuals may
be subject to malnutrition because of low food consumption, both in
developing and developed countries. Much research has focused on food
demand and its implications for nutrition (e.g. Barrett 1999; Behrman and
Deolikar 1987; Bouis 1994; Bouis and Haddad 1992; Duncan 1999; Phillips
and Taylor 1990; Pinstrup-Andersen and Caicedo 1978; Pitt 1983; Pitt,
Rosenzweig and Hassan 1990; Ravallion 1987, 1997; Singh, Squire and
Strauss 1986; Schi¡ and Valde ¨ s 1990; Staatz et al. 1990). While the
relationship between food and human survival is often not explicit in the
literature (e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer 1980; Singh et al. 1986), there is
interest in exploring the links between food security and economic behaviour.
This includes links with saving behaviour (Gersovitz 1983), consumption
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(Dasgupta 1993). As argued by Ravallion (1997) and Barrett (1999), there
is a need to re¢ne our current understanding of food security and the
economics of human survival.
This article develops a dynamic microeconomic model of food security,
stressing the relationships between food demand, nutrition and human
survival. It builds on the work of Gersovitz, Dasgupta, Glomm and
Palumbo, Sen and Dre © ze, and Sen. It emphasises the in£uence of en-
titlements on malnutrition, hunger and starvation and extends Sen's
entitlement approach by integrating it in a dynamic framework under
uncertainty. It explores links between economic rationality, entitlements and
food security. The article also integrates food security with Stigler and
Becker's (1977) household production model that treats consumption goods
as `intermediate goods' that are combined with time and human capital to
produce non-market goods generating utility to the consuming units. This is
relevant here since nutrition is a clear example of a non-market utility-
yielding good that individuals `produce' from food consumption.
Two important characteristics of our approach are worth emphasising.
First, our microeconomic analysis is at the individual level (and not the
household level). The reason is that nutritional status is fundamentally an
individual characteristic. Since signi¢cant di¡erences can exist in the
nutritional status of individuals within the same household, a household level
analysis is too aggregated for our purpose. One implication is that
our analysis is conditional on the (implicit) contracts that govern intra-
household resource allocation. The more traditional household-level analysis
(commonly found in the literature) is typically conditional on the contractual
relationship between the household and the rest of the world (e.g. land rights,
labour contract, inter-household transfers). Here, our analysis adds the
intra-household institutional arrangements (e.g. intra-household transfers)
and investigates their in£uence on individual food security. This is a desirable
feature to the extent that intra-household resource allocation a¡ects
individual food security (e.g. Dre © ze and Sen 1993; Pitt et al. 1990).
Second, uncertainty and dynamics fundamentally characterise food security.
The uncertainty relates to the amount of food available (as in£uenced by the
weather, pest damages, etc.), as well as the ability to pay for it (as in£uenced
by income and price uncertainty). Dynamics relate to both predictable and
unpredictable £uctuations in food allocation over time (e.g. seasonality, food
production uncertainty). In this context, we develop a dynamic representation
of resource allocation for an individual facing possible food insecurity. We
explicitly represent fundamental features of human life: health, nutrition and
death. Since an individual's life is clearly non-stationary, no attempt is made
to provide a stationary representation of dynamic resource allocation
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behaviour, entitlement and food security. We also investigate the links between
food security and a number of policy instruments commonly used in dealing
with malnutrition and starvation. The analysis provides useful insights on the
in£uence of market transaction costs, credit rationing, storage, cash transfers,
as well as in-kind transfers on food security.
2. The model
Consider an individual making resource allocation decisions over time under
uncertainty. Uncertainty is represented by the random vector et. At time t,
the decisions include the control variables xt, and the state variables yt which
evolve over time according to the state equation:
yt1  ft1yt;xt;et; 1
t  0;1;2;... The random vector et has a subjective probability measure
Pe;t j yt;xt, t  0;1;2;... The initial state is also random and has a
probability measure Py;0. The allocation decisions xt made at time t are
subject to the feasibility condition:
xt 2 Xt; 2
where Xt is the feasible set for xt;t  0;1;2;... The individual is assumed
to learn over time. The learning process is represented by the observation of
signals zt at time t, generated as follows:
zt  gtyt;xtÿ1;vt; 3
where vt is a random vector, t  1;2;... The random vector vt has a
subjective probability measure Pv;t j yt;xtÿ1, t  1;2;... Under imperfect
state information, observing the signal zt at time t provides information
about the true state yt. Intuitively, the more correlated the random variables
zt and yt are, the more informative the signal zt is. Equation 3 can re£ect
`active learning' when the individual's decisions x a¡ect directly the
functional relation between zt and yt: zt  gtyt;xtÿ1;vt. Finally, the case of
`perfect state information' is a special case when equation 3 becomes zt  yt,
i.e. when the actual state yt is observed and thus becomes known at time t.
1
Under equation 3, the information available to the individual at time t is
given by the information vector It  z0;...;zt;x0;...;xtÿ1. With I0  z0 as
initial conditions at time t  0, the dynamics of the information vector It is:
1Note that `perfect state information' does not imply the absence of uncertainty. It simply
means that the uncertainty related to the state variables yt is resolved at time t by the
observation of the random variables zt  yt.
The microeconomics of food security 3
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000It1  It;zt1;xt; 4
t  0;1;2;... Given the subjective probability measures Py;0, Pe;t j yt;xt
and Pv;t j yt;xtÿ1;t  1;2;...; learning is represented in a Bayesian
framework. From equations 1 and 3, learning takes place from period t to
period t  1 through the Bayesian updating of the probability distribution
of the state vector yt1.
Assume that the preferences of the individual at time t  0 are given by
the ex-ante utility function E0f
P1
t0 b
tUyt;xtg, where E0 is the expectation
operator based on the subjective information available at time t  0, b is the
discount factor 0 < b < 1 re£ecting time preferences, and Uyt;xt is a
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function at time t. The individual makes
allocation decisions over time by maximising his/her preference function
subject to the constraints of expressions 1, 2, 3 and 4 re£ecting the
individual's socio-economic environment. This is represented by the
dynamic programming problem (Bertsekas 1976, p. 118):
VtIt  Maxxt2XtfEtUyt;xt  bEtVt1It;gt1ft1yt;xt;et;xt;vt1;xtg 5
for any time period t, where Et is the expectation operator based on It, the
information available at time t. Equation 5 is Bellman's equation, which
de¢nes recursively the optimal value function at time t, VtIt.
The general problem in equation 5 can be specialised to handle the
economics of food, nutrition and health. Let xt denote the vector of
commodities under the control of the individual at time t. Since we focus our
attention on food allocation, we will distinguish explicitly between food and
non-food items. On that basis, we consider xt  xfc;t;xfm;t;xnc;t;xnp;t;xnm;t,
where:
xfc;t  quantity of food commodities consumed at time t,
2
xfm;t  quantity of food commodities marketed at time t, assumed to be
positive (negative) when sold (purchased),
xnc;t  quantity of non-food commodities consumed as ¢nal products at
time t,
xnp;t  quantity of non-food commodities controlled by the individual,
assumed to be positive (negative) for outputs produced (inputs
used),
xnm;t  quantity of non-food commodities marketed at time t, assumed to
be positive (negative) when sold (purchased).
2Throughout the article, the term `food' is used generically to mean all commodities
providing a source of nutrients to the individual.
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grains) as well as non-storable foods (e.g. fresh fruits). Similarly, the non-
food commodities in xnc;t;xnp;t;xnm;t include non-durable goods (e.g.
services), durable goods (e.g. housing, clothing), as well as the individual's
time. Thus, the individual's leisure time is part of the vector xnc;t, the time
spent on `household production' is an element of the vector ÿxnp;t, and the
individual's time spent on wage labour is part of the vector xnm;t.
Next, let yt  yh;t;yp;t;yw;t;yf;t;yn;t;yo;t, where:
yh;t  the individual's health status,
yp;t  quantity of food commodities produced under the control of the
individual at time t,
yw;t  the individual's monetary wealth,
yf;t  inventory level of food commodities at time t,
yn;t  inventory level of non-food commodities under the control of the
individual at time t (including his/her physical capital), and
yo;t  other relevant state variables (including the individual's human
capital).
The variables yp;t;yw;t;yf;t;yn;t measure the amount of resources under the
control of the individual, conditional on a set of property rights. This will
require modelling explicitly income transfers as well as in-kind transfers
(both inter- and intra-household) a¡ecting the individual (see below). We
assume that the state variables yp;t;yw;t;yf;t;yn;t are imperfectly known
before time t, but become observed by the individual at time t. However, the
other state variables yh;t;yo;t may not be observable at time t, thus
contributing to imperfect state information.
The state equation 1 includes the dynamic individual's health function:
yh;t1  fh;t1yh;t;xfc;t;xnc;t;et; 6
Equation 6 relates the individual's health at time t  1 to previous health
status yh;t, food consumption xfc;t, non-food consumption xnc;t (e.g. health
care), as well as uncertain factors et (e.g. accident, illness). The relationship
between food consumption and health in equation 6 can be characterised in





where Nt is the vector of nutrients intake by the individual at time t, and
Ntxfc;t is the `nutrient production function', which translates food
consumption xfc;t into nutrients intake. In equation 6
0, the e¡ects of food
consumption on the individual's health are through their impact on the
nutritional status Nt.
The following assumptions will be made about equation 6:
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decreasing (non-increasing) in xfc;t for small (large) values of xfc;t.
Assumption A2: The function fh;t1yh;t; exhibits an absorbing state y
a
h





for all feasible values of xfc;t;xnc;t;et, and fh;t1yh;t;xfc;t;xnc;t;et  y
a
h for all
feasible values of yh;t;xfc;t;xnc;t;et.
Assumption A3: There exists a non-empty food consumption set
St  fxfc;t : xfc;t  0g satisfying:
1. fh;t1yh;t;xfc;t;xnc;t;et  y
a
h for any xfc;t 2 St, for all feasible values of
yh;t;xnc;t;et, and
2. if xfc;t 2 St;, then x
0
fc;t 2 St for any x
0
fc;t satisfying 0  x
0
fc;t  xfc;t.
Assumption A4: There exists a time t
a  0 such that:
Probyh;t  y
a
h  1 for all t > t
a, for all feasible xt;yt, t  0;...;t
a.
Assumptions A1 and A3 re£ect the nutritional e¡ects of food intake on
health. Too little food leads to malnutrition and health deterioration and too
much food has adverse health e¡ects (e.g. indigestion). The peak of the




0. This latter peak is the nutrients intake typically recommended
by nutritionists and dietitians.
Assumption A2 characterises death by the absorbing state y
a
h. In A2, the
individual's death is represented as the lower bound of the health index
fh;t1:, i.e. as the most extreme form of health deterioration. The absorbing
state y
a
h re£ects the irreversibility of death. Assumption A3 states that food
consumption is necessary to sustain life.
3 It de¢nes a set St of low food
consumption such that choosing any xfc;t 2 St necessarily implies the
individual's death (as re£ected by y
a
h). Thus, the set St can be interpreted as
the `starvation set'. Finally, assumption A4 indicates that the individual's life
is surely ¢nite, no matter what decisions he/she makes. Assumptions A1^
A4 re£ect the biological realities of human life.
The state equation 1 also includes the food production equation:
yp;t1  fp;t1yh;t;yn;t;yo;t;xnp;t;et: 7
3Note that this assumption would not hold if the observation period is very short: an
individual could possibly survive without food for a few days. Thus, throughout the article,
we assume that the observation period is `long enough' to guarantee that the absence of food
intake would necessarily induce the individual's death.
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individual, yp;t1, depends on the individual's health status yh;t, on his/her
physical capital yn;t, on his/her human capital yo;t, on the vector xnp;t of non-
food inputs (including the individual's time), on non-food outputs involved
in the production process, and on the random variables et. The delayed
e¡ects of inputs at time t yh;t;yn;t;yo;t;xnp;t on food outputs at time t  1
yp;t1 re£ect the existence of biological lags typically found in food
production processes. The individual's health status yh;t can in£uence food
production through its e¡ects on labour productivity (e.g. Strauss 1986). The
random variables et in equation 7 indicate the presence of production
uncertainty (e.g. the unpredictable e¡ects of weather on crop yield). The food
production equation in equation 7 is assumed to represent both the
household production technology as well as the institutional setting re£ecting
various contracts between the individual and its socio-economic environ-
ment. These contracts can be either implicit or explicit. They could be intra-
household contracts between the individual and other household members
or they could be contracts between the individual and other members of
society (e.g. property rights). To the extent that these contracts a¡ect the
individual's control and access to resources, they can have a direct in£uence
on the food produced under the control of the individual.
The state equation 1 includes the dynamic individual's monetary wealth
function:
yw;t1  fw;t1yw;t;xfm;txnm;t;et
 1  atyw;t  pf;txfm;t  pn;txnm;t ÿ sf;tyf;t ÿ sn;tyn;t  Tw;t;
8a
subject to:
yw;t  pf;txfm;t  pn;txnm;t ÿ sf;tyf;t ÿ sn;tyn;t  Tw;t  Rt; 8b
where at is the rate of return on monetary wealth held at time t, pf;t  0 is
the price vector for the food commodities xfm;t, pn;t  0 is the price vector for
the non-food commodities xnm;t;sf;t  0 is the unit storage cost of food,
sn;t  0 is the unit storage cost of non-food at time t, Tw;t denotes exogenous
income transfer, and Rt  0 is a parameter measuring the individual's largest
borrowing capacity re£ecting possible credit rationing. The random variables
et in equation 8a can represent uncertainty about the rate of return at and
prices pf;t;pn;t;sf;t;sn;t. We assume that the prices pf;t;pn;t;sf;t;sn;t are
observed at time t, but may not be precisely known before time t. The
income transfer Tw;t can be positive or negative: it is positive when paid to
the individual, and negative when paid by the individual at time t. The
variables xfm;t and xnm;t being positive for sales and negative for purchases, it
follows that pf;txfm;t  pn;txnm;t in equations 8a or 8b denotes the net income
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The individual time being included among non-food commodities, pn;txnm;t
includes wage income from the labour market. Finally, sf;tyf;t  sn;tyn;t in
equations 8a or 8b denotes the storage cost of both food and non-food
items.
In general, the determination of market prices pf;t;pn;t in equations 8a





the market prices for food and non-food items, respectively, in some central
markets.
4 The individual's access to these markets may be costly. Let the






























n;t if xnm;t > 0;
8d
where p
ÿ denotes e¡ective purchase prices, p





n;t  0 are the individual's unit transaction costs of purchasing the
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n;t can re£ect information costs, transportation
costs, etc.
5 They create a wedge between buying prices p


















n;t  0. When positive,
this price wedge corresponds to a sunk cost for the individual since any









n;t, and the incentive for the individual to trade
declines. And if sunk costs become large, there is no incentive to trade, and
the individual would choose not to participate in markets (by choosing
xfm;t  0 and/or xnm;t  0).
In general, the individual's borrowing capacity parameter Rt  0 in
equation 8b represents credit rationing and re£ects the functioning of the
capital market. In the absence of credit rationing, Rt  1, there is
4For simplicity, we consider only the case of competitive markets. The extension to
situations with market power would be fairly straightforward. It would involve specifying
pf;t  pfxfm;t and pn;t  pnxnm;t, where the market prices depend on the corresponding
volumes transacted.
5These costs need not be symmetric for buying versus selling. For example, because of
di¡erent back-hauling possibilities, transportation costs to the central markets can di¡er
from transportation costs from the central markets.
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time. Equation 8a then is the individual's intertemporal budget constraint on
the evolution of his/her monetary wealth over time. It states that wealth at
time t equals: previous wealth yw;t; plus net income from trading food
commodities pf;txfm;t as well as non-food commodities pn;txnm;t; minus
storage cost sf;tyf;t  sn;tyn;t; plus income transfer Tw;t.
In contrast, in the presence of credit rationing, Rt < 1. For example, if
Rt  0, credit rationing becomes e¡ective whenever the individual's equity
falls below zero. This re£ects a situation where the individual cannot borrow
against future wealth in order to ¢nance current expenditures. In this case,
the inequality in equation 8b becomes binding. Under credit rationing,
equation 8b becomes a single period budget constraint, and the individual's
ability to smooth intertemporal expenditures deteriorates.
The state equation 1 also includes the dynamics of the state variables
yf;t;yn;t measuring the individual's inventory holding of durable goods. The
dynamics of yf;t;yn;t take the form:
yf;t1  ff;t1yf;t;yp;t;xfc;t;xfm;t  1 ÿ dfyf;t  yp;t ÿ xfc;t ÿ xfm;t  Tf;t; 9a
subject to
0  yf;t  yp;t ÿ xfc;t ÿ xfm;t  Tf;t  Kf;t; 9b
and
yn;t1  fn;t1yn;t;xnp;t;xnc;t;xnm;t  1 ÿ dnyn;t  xnp;t ÿ xnc;t ÿ xnm;t  Tn;t;
9c
subject to
0  yn;t  xnp;t ÿ xnc;t ÿ xnm;t  Tn;t  Kn;t; 9d
where df and dn are depreciation rates for food and non-food commodities,
Tf;t and Tn;t are exogenous in-kind transfers at time t, and Kf;t;Kn;t  0 are
parameters measuring the individual's maximum `storage capacity' for food
and non-food commodities, respectively. The in-kind transfers Tf;t and Tn;t in
equations 9a^9d can be positive or negative: they are positive when they
are transfers to the individual, and negative when they are transfers from the
individual. The parameter values Kf;t and Kn;t in equations 9b and 9d re£ect
the durability or storability of the corresponding commodities: positive
values are associated with durable commodities, while zero values imply
non-storable goods. For non-storable foods, Kf;t  0 and equations 9a and
9b imply yf;t1  0 for all t. In the absence of transfers Tf;t  0, this
generates the traditional de¢nition of `marketed surplus' xfm;t as the
di¡erence between food production yp;t and food consumption xfc;t:
xfm;t  yp;t ÿ xfc;t. For storable foods Kf;t > 0 and in the absence of transfers
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that is neither consumed xfc;t nor sold xfm;t is added to previous food
stocks yn;t, as long as the maximum storage capacity Kf;t is not reached.
Similar interpretations apply to non-food items in equations 9c and 9d,
whether they are durable Kn;t > 0 or not Kn;t  0. Examples of durable
non-food items include various forms of physical capital under the
individual's control (e.g. consumer durable, land, buildings, machinery). An
example of a non-storable non-food item is the individual's time. In this
context, with Kn;t  yn;t  yn;t1  0, interpret Tn;t as the total amount of time
available to the individual each period (e.g. 24 hours per day). Then,
equation 9d generates the standard time constraint: total time available Tn;t
equals leisure time xnc;t, plus wage labour xnm;t, plus the amount of time
spent in the `household production process' ÿxnp;t.
Finally, the dynamics of the state variables yo;t in equation 1 is written
as:
yo;t1  fo;t1yt;xfc;t;xnc;t;et: 10
We interpret yo;t as a vector of non-market goods other than the individual's
health status yh;t. These non-market goods include the individual's human
capital, the enjoyment of eating, etc. In equation 10, the non-market goods
yo;t1 are obtained from a household production process that combines
previous states yt with consumption of food items xfc;t and non-food items
xnc;t, along with uncertain factors et. Since non-food xnc;t includes the
individual's leisure, equation 10 is consistent with Stigler and Becker's (1977)
household production model, where time and market goods are combined
to produce non-market goods.
In the characterisation of individual behaviour, equations 6^10 thus
represent the dynamic state equation 1. We focus on the case where the
individual utility function Uyt;xt in equation 5 takes the form:
U  Uyh;t;yo;t: 11
In equation 11, only the non-market goods yh;t;yo;t are assumed to enter
the utility function. This is consistent with Stigler and Becker's household
model, which assumes that market goods are combined with time and human
capital to generate non-market goods, which in turn generate utility. The
inclusion of yh;t;yo;t as utility-yielding goods means that equations 6 and 10
can be interpreted as production functions for the corresponding non-market
goods. The speci¢cation in equation 11 implies that wealth yw;t, food or
non-food inventories yf;t;yn;t, production decisions yp;t;xnp;t, consumption
decisions xfc;t;xnc;t, or marketing decisions xfm;t;xnm;t do not have a direct
e¡ect on individual welfare. Rather, these variables have an impact on
welfare only by a¡ecting the production of the non-market utility-yielding
10 J.-P. Chavas
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000goods yh;t1;yo;t1 through the individual's market and resource allocation
decisions (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980, p. 245).
The utility function in equation 11 is assumed to satisfy the following
assumption:
Assumption A5: Uyh;t;yo;t > Uy
a
h;yo;t  U
a for all feasible yh;t;yo;t
satisfying yh;t > y
a
h.
Assumption A5 states that death (corresponding to y
a
h) provides a lower
bound U
a on the utility index U. It simply means that the individual would
always choose life over death.
Finally, the feasible set Xt in equation 2 is de¢ned as Xt  fxt:
xfc;t  0;xnc;t  0, equations 8b, 9b and 9d}. It re£ects appropriate non-
negativity constraints on xt xfc;t  0;xnc;t  0, along with the ¢nancial
constraint in equation 8b and the physical constraints in equations 9b and 9d
restricting individual choice.
Given these assumptions, the optimisation problem in equation 5
becomes:
VtIt  Maxxt2XtfEtUyh;t;yo;t  bEtVt1It;gt1ft1yt;xt;et;xt;vt1;xtg
12
where ft1 is given in equations 6^10. Denote the solution of the
optimisation problem in equation 12 by x

tIt. The optimal dynamics is
then given by: yt1  ft1yt;x

tIt;et and It1  It;gt1yt;xtÿ1;vt;x

tIt.
The formulation in equation 12 is general enough to allow for imperfect
state information (where the actual value of some of the state variables in
yt is unobservable at time t) and active learning (where the individual's
decisions in£uence how much information becomes available over time).
This is important since the individual's nutritional status and health status
are often imperfectly known. Also, individuals can learn about the state
variable yh through nutrition education, health education, health
monitoring, etc.
Perfect state information is a special case of equation 12. It corresponds
to the situation where equation 3 becomes zt  yt, i.e. where learning takes
place through the observation of the actual state yt at time t. Then, equation
12 simpli¢es to (e.g. Bertsekas 1976, p. 50):
Vtyt  Maxxt2XtfEtUyh;t;yo;t  bEtVt1ft1yt;xt;etg; 12
0
where ft1 is given in equations 6^10. The optimal control associated with
equation 12
0 can be written as x

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The general model just presented can provide a basis for analysing the
individual's behaviour. First, it is an extension of Stigler and Becker's (1977)
model, incorporating risk and learning in the individual's production,
consumption and investment decisions. Second, the model explicitly handles
the evolution of the individual's health yh over time. This includes the
endogeneity of death, as represented by the absorbing state y
a
h under
assumptions A2, A3 and A4. While assumption A4 makes the individual's
death certain in the long run, the probability of living (or dying) is still
subject to management in the short run. In this section, we investigate the
behavioural implications of our model, focusing on the role of food and
nutrition in the management of the individual's health.
Under di¡erentiability, the ¢rst-order condition for an interior solution
to the problem in equation 12 is:
Etf@Vt1=@zt1@gt1=@yt1@ft1=@xt  @gt1=@xt  @Vt1=@xtg  0: 13
Equation 13 decomposes the marginal utility of xt into three additive parts.
The ¢rst term in equation 13, Et@Vt1=@zt1@gt1=@yt1@ft1=@xt, re£ects
the marginal e¡ect of xt on the state variable yt1. This e¡ect remains present
even in the absence of uncertainty. More generally, it re£ects the in£uence
of the decisions xt under perfect state information. To see that, consider the
special case of equation 12
0 where equation 3 takes the form zt  yt
corresponding to perfect state information. Under di¡erentiability, the ¢rst-
order condition for an interior solution to equation 12
0 is:
Et@Vt1=@yt1@ft1=@xt  0: 13
0
By comparing equations 13 and 13
0, it is clear that the term in equation 13
0
corresponds to the ¢rst term in equation 13. Thus, the ¢rst term in equation
13 re£ects the marginal valuation of xt under perfect state information. This
implies that the second and third terms in equation 13 are necessarily
associated with imperfect state information.
Equation 13 characterises the individual's optimal behaviour. We explore
its implications for food allocation. First, consider the food consumption
decision xfc;t. From equation 13, the ¢rst-order condition for an interior
solution to xfc;t is:
Etf@Vt1=@zt1@gt1=@yh;t1@fh;t1=@xfc;t ÿ @gt1=@yf;t11 ÿ df
 @gt1=@yo;t1@fo;t1=@xfc;t  @gt1=@xfc;t
 @Vt1=@xfc;tg  0:
14a
Equation 14a includes ¢ve additive terms. The ¢rst term measures the e¡ect
of food consumption on health, @fh;t1=@xfc;t. The second term concerns the
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the non-nutritional bene¢ts of food consumption as it in£uences yo;t1. The
fourth term (involving @gt1=@xfc;t) and the ¢fth term Et@Vt1=@xfc;t
correspond to imperfect state information. This shows that the motivations
for food consumption decisions can be complex.
Second, consider the food marketing decision xfm;t. The ¢rst-order
necessary condition for an interior solution to xfm;t is:
Etf@Vt1=@zt1@gt1=@yw;t11  atpt ÿ @gt1=@yf;t11 ÿ df
 @gt1=@xfm;t  @Vt1=@xfm;tg  0:
14b
Equation 14b includes four additive terms. The ¢rst term measures the e¡ect
of food marketing on the individual's budget constraint as re£ected by
yw;t1. The second term concerns the e¡ect of food marketing on food
inventory yf;t1. The third term (involving @gt1=@xfm;t) and the fourth term
Et@Vt1=@xfm;t re£ect imperfect state information. Again, this indicates that
the motivations for making food marketing decisions can be complex.
Equations 14a and 14b can be combined to yield:
Etf@Vt1=@zt1@gt1=@yh;t1@fh;t1=@xfc;t  @gt1=@yo;t1@fo;t1=@xfc;t
 @gt1=@xfc;t  @Vt1=@xfc;tg
 Etf@Vt1=@zt1@gt1=@yw;t11  atpt ÿ @gt1=@xfm;t  @Vt1=@xfm;tg:
15
How does this analysis relate to more traditional microeconomic analysis
of behaviour? In the context of food demand and nutrition, the investigation
of an `optimal diet' has been the subject of much research (e.g. Stigler
1945; Silberberg 1985). The optimal diet problem can be formulated as
follows:
Minxfc;t0fptxfc;t: N  Ntxfc;tg; 16
where Ntxfc;t is the nutrient production function in equation 6
0 and N is
exogenously given. For example, N can be set equal to the nutrients actually
consumed by the individual (e.g. Silberberg 1985). Alternatively, N can be
chosen as the nutrients intake associated with a balanced diet recommended
by nutritionists or dietitians. Denote the solution of equation 16 by x
d
fc;tN.
It can provide a basis for investigating the links between food demand and
nutrition. But, under what conditions does equation 16 provide an appro-
priate characterisation of consumption behaviour as given by equation 12?
To answer this question, decompose the optimisation problem in equation 12
into two stages: a ¢rst stage where xfc;t is chosen subject to the additional
constraint N  Ntxfc;t, conditional on given values of N and the other
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control variables are chosen. The ¢rst stage is:
Maxxfc;t0fEtVt1It;gt1yt1;xt;vt1;xt: N  Ntxfc;t;equ: 6{10g: 17
Denote by x
c
fc;tN the optimal solution in equation 17, and by N

t the optimal
solution for N in the second stage. The ¢rst stage problem in equation 17
being just a decomposition of the original problem in equation 12, the ¢rst
stage decision is necessarily consistent with the optimal decision associated






t. We want to know under
what conditions is the solution of equation 12 (and thus equation 17) also
the solution of the diet problem equation 16.
De¢nition 1: The minimal cost diet problem in equation 16 is consistent with





for all feasible N.
Conditions satisfying this consistency are presented next. (See the proof
in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1: Assuming a positive marginal utility of income, the minimal
cost diet problem in equation 16 is consistent with the individual's behaviour
given by equation 12 if:
1. all the state variables yt become observed at time t, and
2. the state variables yo;t1 are not a¡ected by food consumption xfc;t.
Proposition 1 presents conditions that makes the diet problem in equation
16 consistent with the more general allocation problem in equation 12. When













optimal nutrients intake from equation 12. This indicates that the diet
problem in equation 16 can provide a useful basis for investigating food and
nutrition decisions. Proposition 1 states that equation 16 is consistent with
equation 12 if there is perfect state information, and if nutrition is the only
motivation for consuming food. However, these two conditions are rather
restrictive. First, the individual's health status is typically not perfectly
known and is often the subject of active learning as the individual spends
resources to monitor and evaluate his/her health over time. Second, food
consumption seems prompted at least in part by non-nutritional motives.
This includes factors such as the enjoyment of eating, food taste, food
appearance, etc. Under such conditions, the minimal cost diet in equation 16
will not be consistent with individual behaviour given in equation 12.
To illustrate these arguments, consider the di¡erentiable case. Under
condition 1 in proposition 1, there is perfect state information. And under
condition 2, @fo;t1=@xfc;t  0. Under these conditions, assuming that the
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@Nt=@xfc;t  pt: 18
Interpreting
Et@Vt1=@zt1@gt1=@yh;t1@yh;t1=@Nt=Et@Vt1=@zt1@@t1=@yw;t11  at
as the shadow price of nutrients, equation 18 states that the marginal value
product of xfc;t equals the vector of food prices pt. This familiar condition
implies cost minimising behaviour as stated in equation 16. In this case,
equation 16 can be interpreted as a ¢rst stage decomposition of the more
general allocation problem in equation 12. However, comparing equations
15 and 18, it is clear that equation 18 is a rather restrictive case. As noted
above, under imperfect state information or non-nutritional motives for food
consumption, equation 18 does not hold in general, and cost minimising
behaviour in equation 16 is not consistent with the individual's behaviour
given in equation 12. The empirical results presented by Silberberg (1985)
give strong evidence of the inconsistency of the two problems. Silberberg
showed that, compared to x





fewer food commodities as it specialises in the food items that provide a






 tends to grow with income, as non-nutritional
motives for food consumption become more important with higher income.
On this basis, in many situations, one would expect observed behaviour to be
inconsistent with the diet problem in equation 16.
So, is there any situation where the diet problem in equation 16 may be
consistent with the more general allocation problem in equation 12? We





h  n identifying low levels of the individual's health status, for
some small n > 0. We assume that the parameter n > 0 is chosen according
to medical criteria such that y
a
h  n represents some critical level of
deteriorated health.
De¢nition 2: Given the information It available at time t, de¢ne the
`malnutrition set' Mt as follows:
6
6De¢nition 2 de¢nes malnutrition in terms of the expected health, Et fh;t1. Note that
alternative measures could be used as well. For example, in de¢nition 2, expected health Et
fh;t1 could be replaced by median health or by some decile of the probability distribution
of health, yh;t1.
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a
h  n;
Et fh;t1yh;t;xfc;t  d;xnc;t;et > y
a
h  n; for some d > 0g;
where Et denotes the expectation operator given It.
By de¢nition 2, any allocation xt 2 Mt  Xt generates (on average) a low
health status: y
a
h < Etyh;t1  y
a
h  n. This low health level can be attributed
to malnutrition since an increase in food intake is su¤cient to improve the
expected individual's health: Et fh;t1yh;t;xfc;t  d;xnc;t;et > y
a
h  n. It is on
this basis that the set Mt is called the `malnutrition set'. Finally, note that,
food being necessary to sustain life (from assumption A3), the malnutrition
set is always non-empty Mt 6 ; for a healthy individual (where a healthy
individual is any one with a `high' expected health level, Etyh;t1. For
example, from assumption A3, any feasible xt satisfying xfc;t 2 St (e.g.
xfc;t  0) is necessarily an element of Mt for a healthy individual. This
suggests that all healthy individuals will be concerned with possible
malnutrition. This is the issue of `food security' further discussed in the next
section.
Assuming that Mt 6 ;, any allocation xt 2 Mt represents a situation where
the individual's health status yh;t1 is low because of lack of food
consumption. Under what conditions is it likely that x

t 2 Mt, where x

t is the
solution of equation 12? This could happen under two possible scenarios.
In the ¢rst scenario, the feasible set Xt is larger than Mt, but the individual is
poorly informed on his/her health status yh;t1. In this case, the individual
could choose xt 62 Mt, but may elect to be malnourished because of poor
nutritional information. Individuals who are poorly informed about nutrition
and its health e¡ects include infants and children. They can also include
adults who are unaware of the strong links between individual nutrition and
health. In addressing malnutrition issues, this stresses the role and
importance of nutrition education.
The second scenario is the one where the malnutrition set Mt and the
feasible set Xt are the same: Mt  Xt. In this case, no matter what decision
is made about xt, the individual has no choice but to be severely
malnourished: xt 2 Mt  Xt. This may happen because not enough food is
available, and/or because the individual is not entitled to the food that is
available (Sen 1981).
We make the following additional assumption.
Assumption A6: For an individual facing Mt  Xt, the e¡ect of food
consumption of xfc;t on the state variables yo;t1 (as given by equation 10) is
negligible.
Assumption A6 states that the feasible set Xt is a region where the marginal
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consumption does not provide non-nutritional bene¢ts to an individual who
is constrained to be severely malnourished. It is consistent with a common
symptom of near-starvation: the insensitivity of the su¡erer to every other
feeling except that of satisfying his/her own wants for food intake.
What are the implications of our analysis for individual behaviour? To
answer this question, note that the optimisation problem in equation 12 is


















of the wealth equation 8, and Tf;t;Tn;t;Kf;t;Kn;t are parameters of the
inventory equation 9. What are the e¡ects of changing the parameters Bt on
behaviour x
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t. The vector B
0
t is de¢ned such that it satis¢es Mt  Xt.
The vector B
0
t thus corresponds to a situation where the individual is































































































































t. The following results hold. (See the proof in the
Appendix.)





















2. Let m denote the total number of nutrients in equation 16. If the
nutrient production function Ntxfc;t in equation 16 is linear, then the





















Proposition 2 compares the individual's behaviour in two situations: a
situation B
0
t where the individual is constrained to be malnourished; and an
improved situation given by B
00
t. It indicates how constrained malnutrition
a¡ects behaviour and how improved nutrition relates to the individual's
behaviour.
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individual being constrained to be malnourished (i.e. facing Mt  Xt) under
assumption A6. Here, `being well informed' is interpreted to correspond to
`perfect state information'. It rules out the case of `poor nutritional
information' discussed in scenario 1 above. And under B
0
t and assumption
A6, the e¡ect of food consumption of xfc;t on the state variables yo;t1 is
negligible: @fo;t1=@xfc;t  0. Under these conditions, the individual's be-
haviour (as represented by equation 12) is consistent with the minimal cost
diet problem (equation 16) (see proposition 1). This is result 1, stating that a
well-informed individual who is constrained to be malnourished Mt  Xt
would behave as if he/she minimises diet cost as given in equation 16. Result
2 shows that such an individual would also tend to consume only a limited
number of food commodities. Under the stated conditions, minimising the
cost of the diet implies consuming a number of food items no larger than
the number of nutrients. Typically, the number of food items available to
most individuals is much larger than the number of nutrients. Result 2 has
signi¢cant implications: the consumption pattern of individuals who
are constrained to be malnourished tends toward specialisation. This
specialisation is characterised by positive consumption of few food items
providing low-cost nutrients, and zero consumption of the other food items
(Silberberg 1985).
Result 3 states that a well-informed individual facing the improved
situation B
00
t may not consume food x

fc;t so as to minimise diet cost. This




















t. The reason is that, if situation B
00
t correspond to Xt 6 Mt,
the individual may consume food for motives other than nutrition (e.g. taste,
appearance, . . . ). This would tend to raise the average cost of nutrients.
Compared to situation B
0
t, it would also tend to increase the number of food
items consumed. Food commodities that would not be consumed under B
0
t
(because of their high cost of providing nutrients) may be consumed under
B
00
t because of their non-nutritional characteristics.
These results are consistent with the empirical evidence presented by
Silberberg (1985), Behrman and Deolikar (1987), Bouis and Haddad (1992),
and others. Silberberg showed that the fraction of food expenditures devoted
to pure nutrition tends to decrease with income. Also, Behrman and
Deolikar (1987), and Bouis and Haddad found that higher income tends to
increase total food expenditure relatively more than nutrients intake. These









w;t. However, proposition 2 applies




























































t. This indicates how the implicit cost of nutrition can vary
with changes in the socio-economic environment surrounding any individual.
Our analysis can help shed some light on food consumption behaviour
and nutrition. An example is the existence of inferior and Gi¡en goods.
Proposition 2 predicts that, under constrained malnutrition Mt  Xt, food
consumption patterns will tend to specialise toward few food items that
provide a cheap source of nutrients. In the case where malnutrition is
associated with low income, this implies that low income will generate a
relatively high consumption of few food items. As income goes up, this
specialisation in food consumption can be expected to disappear. This can
generate negative income e¡ects for the few food items consumed under
constrained malnutrition. As the income of a malnourished individual goes
up, the non-nutritional motives for food consumption become more
important, and the individual diversi¢es his/her consumption patterns: he/
she consumes less of the food items found in the least-cost diet, and more of
other food commodities. As a result, individuals belonging to the lowest
income classes may exhibit negative income elasticities for the foods found in
the least-cost diet. When strong enough (i.e., in the presence of extreme
forms of specialisation in the least-cost diet), these negative income
elasticities can contribute to generating `Gi¡en e¡ects'. An example is potato
consumption during the 1845^48 famine in Ireland (Davies 1994).
Having negative income elasticities for foods in the low-cost diet contributes
to ¢nding small income elasticities for nutrient intake demand (Behrman and
Deolikar 1987; Glomm and Palumbo 1993). This would be especially true if
the least-cost diet is very specialised and/or if nutrition education is poor. In
such situations, increasing income would have only modest e¡ects on nutrient
intake. In addressing malnutrition issues, this points to the limitations of
relying exclusively on income policy, and to the need for complementary policy
instruments (such as restricted in-kind transfers, or nutrition education).
Alternatively, in situations where the least-cost diet is reasonably well
diversi¢ed and nutrition education is good, the links between individual income
and nutritional status are expected to be stronger and positive. Then, raising
income (through either cash transfers or economic development policy) can be
an e¡ective way of dealing with malnutrition problems.
4. Implications for food security
In this section, we further explore the relationships between food
consumption, nutrition and survival. In particular, we analyse food security
in terms of the individual's ability to avoid starvation. Recall that y
a
h is an
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assumption A2). Given xt, the probability of the individual dying at time
t  1 is the mortality probability:
Prtxt  Probyh;t1  y
a
h: xt 2 Xt;yt1  ft1yt;xt;et
as in equations 6{10;
19
where the probability Prob is evaluated based on the information available
at time t.
We want to study the general e¡ects of the economic decisions xt on the
individual's ability to survive over time.
7 De¢ne the set F
d
t  fxt: Prtxt  1g,
corresponding to the decisions xt that imply the individual's death with
probability one at time t  1. This set is always non-empty F
d
t 6 ;. For
example, any feasible allocation xt generating starvation (i.e., satisfying
xfc;t 2 St) is necessarily an element of the set F
d
t. Also, we de¢ne the set
F
s
t  fxt: Prtxt < 1g as the complement of F
d
t in Xt, i.e. as the set of all
feasible decisions xt that provide a positive probability of survival for the
individual at time t  1. The following result is obtained. (See the proof in
the Appendix.)
Proposition 3: Under assumptions A2 and A5, x






t if the set F
s







t  Xt (or equivalently, F
s
t 6 ;).
Proposition 3 states the intuitive result that, under assumption A5, the
individual always prefers positive probabilities of survival Prt < 1 to the
certainty of death Prt  1. He/she always tries to avoid choosing xt in the
set F
d
t, except when there is no other feasible choice, i.e. when the set F
s
t is
empty. But when is the set F
s
t empty? For a living individual, the set F
s
t would
be empty in situations of extreme deprivation involving a lack of access to
basic necessities such as food or health care.
Consider the case where the individual has limited access to food
consumption at time t. As argued above, the individual will choose x

fc;t 2 St
only if there is no other feasible choice. It implies that starvation is always
the outcome of severely constrained choices. This has motivated the
`entitlement approach' to food security, as proposed by Sen.
Our analysis allows alternative characterisations of food security. For
example, a situation of trade-independent food security corresponds to:
fxt: xt 2 Xt;xfm;t  0g \ fxt: xt 2 Xt;xfc;t 62 Stg 6 ;. This means that, in the
7Ravallion (1987) has examined the properties of the mortality probability Prtxt with
respect to food consumption xfc;t, and its implications for the management of famine relief
policy.
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falling within the starvation set St (Sen 1981, p. 172). In general, adult
members of well-endowed farm households facing favourable agro-climatic
conditions are expected to exhibit trade-independent food security. However,
as noted by Sen (1981, p. 173), trade-independent security does not
characterise a large part of the world population. The development of trade,
the specialisation of labour, and the associated growth in urban populations
have contributed to a decline in trade-independent food security around the
world. For example, in the absence of transfers, any member of a working
class with nothing to sell but labour power (e.g. urban worker, or landless
agricultural labourer) typically lacks trade-independent food security.
Similarly, a situation of production-independent food security corresponds
to: fxt: xt 2 Xt;yp;t  0g \ fxt: xt 2 Xt;xfc;t 62 Stg 6 ;. This means that, in
the absence of food production yp;t  0, it remains possible to choose xt
without facing certain starvation. In the presence of active food markets,
adult members of rich urban households are expected to exhibit production-
independent food security. However, production-independent food security
is typically not satis¢ed for members of most farm households around the
world. For example, in the absence of transfers, any member of a farm
household that does not generate signi¢cant o¡-farm income typically lacks
production-independent food security. In general, food security is threatened
for farm households facing agricultural production shortfall due to drought,
pest damage, £ooding, soil erosion and/or environmental degradation.
In addition, a situation of transfer-independent food security corresponds
to: fxt: xt 2 Xt;Tw;t  0;Tf;t  0;Tn;t  0g \ fxt: xt 2 Xt;xfc;t 62 Stg 6 ;. This
means that, in the absence of transfers to the individual Tw;t  0;
Tf;t  0;Tn;t  0, it remains possible to choose xt without starving.
8 In
general, in the presence of active food markets, able-bodied adults in rich
households are expected to exhibit transfer-independent food security.
However, transfer-independent food security is typically not satis¢ed for
signi¢cant parts of the world population. This includes infants, children, and
the elderly, as well as members of poor households. Infants, children and
the elderly commonly rely on income and in-kind transfers from other
members of their household. Poor households are often the targets of income
and in-kind transfers from local institutions, charitable organisations,
8Note that more speci¢c de¢nitions could be given. This includes income-transfer-
independent food security corresponding to: fxt: xt 2 Xt;Tw;t  0g \ fxt: xt 2 Xt;xfc;t 62 Stg 6
;. It implies that it is possible to avoid starvation without income transfer to the individual
Tw;t  0. This also includes food-transfer-independent food security corresponding to:
fxt: xt 2 Xt;Tf;t  0g \ fxt: xt 2 Xt;xfc;t 62 Stg 6 ;. It means that, in the absence of food
transfer to the individual Tf;t  0, it remains possible to choose xt without starving.
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most households bene¢t from insurance schemes that generate `state-
dependent' transfers contributing signi¢cantly to long-term food security in
an uncertain world. Such transfers are part of a system of `safety nets'
implemented in various ways both within the household and across
households. It includes the activities of philanthropic organisations as well as
government agencies involved in disaster assistance, unemployment com-
pensations, etc. It also includes limited liability rules (e.g. bankruptcy laws)
that reduce individuals' exposure to downside risk.
Finally, a situation of stock-independent food security corresponds to:
fxt: xt 2 Xt;yf;t  0g \ fxt: xt 2 Xt;xfc;t 62 Stg 6 ;. It implies that, in the
absence of food stocks yf;t  0, it remains possible to choose xt without
facing starvation. Signi¢cant temporal £uctuations in supply and market
conditions can contribute to the absence of stock-independent food security.
This corresponds to situations where seasonality, cyclical production (as
typically found in agriculture) and/or uncertainty about the economic
environment (e.g. production risk or price uncertainty) are important
features of the individual's surroundings. In general, in the presence of active
food markets, adult members of well-endowed households would exhibit
stock-independent food security. Alternatively, in the absence of transfers
and under poorly functioning food markets, considerable £uctuations and
uncertainty in temporal food production can yield a lack of stock-
independent food security. This characterises many farm households in
developing countries. It stresses the role of food stocks in food security.
The above discussion suggests a need to focus on the factors restricting
the feasible set for food consumption xfc;t. Under what situations would food
consumption xfc;t be constrained within the starvation set St? Recall the
de¢nition of the feasible set Xt  fxt: xfc;t  0;xnc;t  0, equations 8b, 9b and
9dg. Equations 8b and 9b give the following inequalities:
ÿpf;txfm;t  yw;t  Rt  pn;txnm;t ÿ sf;tyf;t ÿ sn;tyn;t  Tw;t; 20a
and
xfc;t  yf;t  yp;t ÿ xfm;t  Tf;t: 20b
Equation 20a is a budget constraint setting an upper-bound on food
purchases ÿxfm;t. It shows that food expenditures ÿpf;txfm;t can be no
greater than current equity yw;t, plus maximal borrowing capacity Rt,
plus income from non-food commodities pn;txnm;t,
9 minus storage cost
sf;tyf;t  sn;tyn;t, plus income transfer to the individual Tw;t. Equation 20b
9Recall that time allocation is included as a non-food commodity. As a result, pn;txnm;t
includes wage income earned by the individual on the labour market.
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t xfc;t can be no greater than the sum of food stocks yf;t, food production
yp;t, food purchases ÿxfm;t, and food transfers Tf;t.
In the case where food is treated as a single aggregate commodity,
equations 20a and 20b yield:
xfc;t  yf;t  yp;t  yw;t  Rt  pn;txnm;t ÿ sf;tyf;t ÿ sn;tyn;t  Tw;t=pf;t  Tf;t: 21
Equation 21 illustrates that the largest feasible food consumption xfc;t is
positively related to food stock yf;t, food production yp;t, monetary
wealth yw;t, maximal borrowing capacity Rt, non-food income
pn;txnm;t, income transfer Tw;t, and food transfer Tf;t; and negatively
related to storage cost sf;tyf;t  sn;tyn;t and food price pf;t. Given
xt 2 Xt, this shows that the upper-bound for xfc;t depends on the para-









from assumption A3, the level of this upper-bound in£uences whether or
not the xfc;t is restricted to be within the starvation set St. On the one hand,
a su¤ciently low upper-bound implies starvation: xfc;t 2 St for all feasible
xt 2 Xt. On the other hand, a su¤ciently high upper-bound guarantees that
the individual can avoid starvation: fxfc;t: xt 2 Xt;xfc;t 62 Stg 6 ;. This
establishes the link between the economic environment (as represented by the
parameter vector Bt) and whether or not the constraint xfc;t 2 St is binding.







corresponding to a situation of extreme deprivation where the individual
































































































































t. The following result follows directly
from assumption A3 and the de¢nition of the feasible set Xt 
fxt: xfc;t  0;xnc;t  0, equations 8b, 9b and 9dg.





;  fxt: xt 2 Xt;xfc;t 62 St; given B
d




1  Prtxt; given B
d
t  Prtxt; given B
s
t;
where Prt is de¢ned in equation 19.
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t tends to enlarge the non-
starvation set fxt: xt 2 Xt;xfc;t 62 St; given Btg and increase the individual's
odds of survival. It also indicates which changes in the individual's economic
environment contribute to improving food security. This is of interest to
the extent that these changes are linked to speci¢c policy instruments. First,


















improving food security. This re£ects the role of inventories in managing













n;t to the individual can help avoid starvation. These are
the most common policy instruments used in dealing with famines, poverty
and malnutrition. Income transfers can involve intra-household transfers,
remittances, income tax, and cash-welfare government programs. In-kind
transfers can involve food as well as non-food. Food transfers include intra-
household transfers (e.g. to infants and children) as well as food aid
implemented by charitable organisations (e.g. soup kitchens), government
agencies (e.g. food stamp program), or international agencies. Non-food
transfers include public works, inheritance as well as changes in property
rights (e.g. land tenure reform). For example, Sen has argued that India's
public employment schemes are a principal reason why India has eliminated
famine over the last few decades. Third, a reduction in capital market





ameliorate food security. This stresses the importance of a properly
functioning capital market in dealing with famines, starvation and

























d can strengthen food security. This
shows that market ine¤ciencies can contribute to food insecurity. And
investments in infrastructure that reduce transportation cost (railroads,
bridges, all-season roads, etc.) and information cost (e.g. published price
surveys, market analysis) can help individuals avoid famines and starvation.
This stresses the role of markets in managing food security.
As illustrated in equation 21, any decrease (increase) in non-food to food
price ratios pn;t=pf;t contributes to food insecurity (food security). For
example, over the last decades, rising food prices have contributed
signi¢cantly to several famines in South Asia and Africa, by reducing the
food purchasing power of poor and food-de¢cit households (Sen 1981;
Ravallion 1997). `Cheap food' policies found in many developing countries
in the 1960s and 1970s have helped enhance food security for the urban poor.
`Structural adjustment programs' put in place in the 1980s and 1990s have
mostly ended such policies. With labour being included among non-food
commodities, any decrease (increase) in the wage rate can threaten (improve)
food security for the employed. For example, by reducing food purchasing
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in Bangladesh (Sen 1981; Ravallion 1997).
In a period of increased reliance on markets, the current challenge around
the world is to design market and non-market institutions that e¡ectively
address the issues of food security, malnutrition and starvation, especially
for the poor and the unfortunate. The objective then is to reduce the
probability of individuals falling below some threshold level of food access.
Barrett (1999) identi¢es three key elements to successful food security
strategies: 1 stable employment, income growth, and high labour pro-
ductivity; 2 access to ¢nance, food markets, and storage; and 3 private and
public safety nets providing transfers to those in needs. Over the last few
decades, economic growth has contributed to large improvements in global
food security (Duncan 1999). Yet, food insecurity remains signi¢cant and
tends to be concentrated in areas where both government and markets are
weak (e.g. North Korea in the 1990s). Many non-government organisations
(NGOs) have proved very e¡ective in developing emergency feeding
programs worldwide. But the role of government policy remains signi¢cant
in providing food assistance both domestically and internationally (Barrett
1999; Dre © ze and Sen 1993; Pinstrup-Andersen 1993; Ruttan 1995). This
includes food aid for famine relief, sometimes triggered by `early-warning
systems'. In government food programs, transfers in kind often receive
greater political support than cash assistance, presumably because they
support only the particular expenditures deemed worthy of assistance. Also,
restricted food transfers (e.g. food stamps) have been found to increase
nutrient intake at two to ten times the rate of an equivalent cash transfer
(Chavas and Keplinger 1983; Barrett 1999). Thus, in-kind food transfers can
be e¡ective ways of dealing with food insecurity, provided that they are
properly targeted toward those at nutritional risk. These are strong
arguments in favour of targeted in-kind food assistance programs. For
example, narrowly targeted programs (such as the US WIC program
targeted toward women, infants, and children at nutritional risk) have been
found highly e¡ective in improving bene¢ciaries' nutritional status and
physical well-being (Chavas and Keplinger 1983; Barrett 1999). Yet, because
of high administrative cost and/or di¤culties in identifying individuals
facing food insecurity, targeting is not always feasible. In developed
countries, targeting is often done at the household level on the basis of
income, family size, and work status (e.g. the US food stamp program). This
neglects intra-household variations in food security (e.g. children versus
adults). This is a reminder that, nutritional status being fundamentally an
individual characteristic, any aggregation (e.g. to the household or regional
level) suppresses within-group variability, leading to downward-biased
estimates of food insecurity (Dre © ze and Sen 1993; Pitt et al. 1990). This
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and intra-households. In developing countries, administrative targeting is less
common, largely due to high implementation cost. Rather, `self-targeting'
programs are more common. They are designed so that mostly food-insecure
individuals have an incentive to participate. They include subsidies for
`inferior foods', and food-for-work schemes (Barrett 1999). In general, in-
kind food transfers yield greater additional nutritional intake and are often
better targeted. Alternatively, cash transfers reduce administrative costs, but
are less e¡ective in improving food security.
5. Conclusion
This article has presented a microeconomic model relevant to the analysis
of food security. Since malnutrition and starvation are inherently individual
characteristics, our model is developed at the individual level. This is more
disaggregated than the traditional household-level analysis. Special attention
is given to income as well in-kind transfers. The analysis is general in the
sense that it incorporates dynamics, uncertainty and learning, along with the
basic characteristics of human nutrition and health.
The approach evaluates individual behaviour under alternative situations
of food insecurity, including malnutrition and starvation. It provides useful
insights on how markets and entitlements in£uence individual food security.
First, it helps identify the conditions that generate food insecurity. Second, it
shows how income and nutritional education can interact in their e¡ects on
individual nutritional status. Finally, it shows how policy instruments
commonly used in the management of food security (e.g. market transaction
costs, cash transfers, in-kind transfers, improved infrastructure) relate to
individuals' nutritional and health status. This stresses the need to under-
stand better the institutional relationship between individuals and their
socio-economic environment, including intra-household allocation rules,
inter-household contractual arrangements, and food policy design. A good
understanding of these rules along with their in£uence on resource allocation
and human survival appears crucial in the e¡ective policy management of
food security issues.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the case where all state variables yt are
observed at time t (condition 1 in proposition 1). This is the case of perfect state
information where equation 3 becomes zt  yt (i.e. where gt1yt1;xt;vt1  yt1
in equation 3), and where Vt1It;zt1;xt becomes Vt1yt1 (see equation 12
0). In
this context, assuming that the marginal utility of income is positive, and after
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c
fc;tN of equation 17
can be obtained by solving the following problem:
Minxfc;t0fpf;txfc;t: N  Ntxfc;t;yo;t1  fo;t1yt;xfc;t;xnc;t;etg:





fc;tN if xfc;t is not an argument of the function fo;t1. This
is the case if the state variables yo;t1 are not a¡ected by food consumption xfc;t
(condition 2 in proposition 1).
Proof of Proposition 2: Result 1 follows directly from proposition 1 under
assumption A6 and perfect state information. To prove result 2, note that, Ntxfc;t
being linear, equation 16 becomes a standard linear programming problem with
m constraints. From linear programming, the number of non-zero variables in the
optimal solution cannot exceed m. Result 2 then follows from result 1.




t, note that the feasible set XtB
00
t is at

















t tends to enlarge the feasible set and o¡ers
new opportunities for the feasible set XtB
00











t, assumption A6 no longer





t may no longer be the minimal cost diet. This implies result 3.
Proof of Proposition 3: Noting that F
s
t is the complement of F
d
t in the feasible








t. This means that the
individual chooses to die at time t  1, with yh;t1  y
a
h with probability one. From
assumptions A2 and A5, the utility obtained after the time of death is a strict
lower-bound on all possible utility levels. Thus, as long as the set F
s
t is non-empty,
the optimal choice x

t from equation 12 cannot be an element of the set F
d
t. By
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